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Abstract. Decentralisation is one of the promises introduced by
blockchain technologies: fair and secure interaction amongst peers with
no dominant positions, single points of failure or censorship. Decentrali-
sation, however, appears difficult to be formally defined, possibly a con-
tinuum property of systems that can be more or less decentralised, or
can tend to decentralisation in their lifetime. In this paper we focus on
decentralisation in quorum-based approaches to open (permissionless)
consensus as illustrated in influential protocols such as the Ripple and
Stellar protocols. Drawing from game theory and computational com-
plexity, we establish limiting results concerning the decentralisation vs.
safety trade-off in Ripple and Stellar, and we propose a novel methodol-
ogy to formalise and quantitatively analyse decentralisation in this type
of blockchains.
Keywords: Decentralisation analysis, Quorum systems, Trust Networks, Game
theory, Power indices, Ripple, Stellar
1 Introduction
To allow “any two willing parties to transact directly with each other without
the need for a trusted third party” [31] was one of the main motivations for the
introduction of the Bitcoin blockchain, and several earlier attempts at digital
currencies. A blockchain is a distributed state machine in charge of guaranteeing
the correctness and trustability of data,1 e.g., monetary transactions in the case
of Bitcoin. State updates are recorded in a chain of data blocks. Data are pro-
tected by replication of the state, i.e., of the chain of blocks, within a network of
1 Blockchains can also make the computation trustable, e.g., guaranteeing the fair and
untamperable execution of agreements among peers encoded as programs.
peers. The blockchain protocol must guarantee some form of distributed consen-
sus allowing peers to agree on the information contained in the blockchain, e.g.,
who has been paid, and that no double spending of virtual coins has occurred,
without the supervision of a centralised authority – a currency without a central
bank.
Context: the quest for decentralisation Decentralisation, which can be
informally understood as the lack of dominant positions amongst the indepen-
dent and untrusted peers, is then a strongly desirable property of blockchains.
Decentralisation may involve several aspects of a blockchain definition and ar-
chitecture, and is strongly connected to the problem of governance. There can
be centralisation in the software maintenance, the management of the commu-
nity of peers and users and associated access policies, the management of the
tokenomics and incentives2, the resolution of disputes, and the pooling of peers
(see [18] for early considerations on the decentralisation in Bitcoin).
In this paper we address decentralisation in distributed consensus. Decen-
tralisation in the sense of “any two willing parties” somehow implies openness,
embodied by permissionsless blockchains, where participation is allowed in a
generally unrestricted way. Permissionless blockchains are clearly exposed to the
presence of Byzantine peers, i.e., dishonest peers trying to exploit the network
and not bound to the blockchain protocol. Byzantine distributed consensus is
a long-standing problem, from Lamport’s characterisation [26] and the FLP im-
possibility result [13], to the subsequent research on data replication and consis-
tency based on Byzantine Fault-tolerant consensus (BFT), [28,36]. Several pro-
posals are currently competing in a multi-billion market, addressing the so-called
blockchain trilemma, i.e., achieving security, scalability and decentralisation to-
gether.
One of the breakthroughs of Bitcoin was the introduction of the Proof-of-
Work (PoW) [9] as a mechanism to enable a probabilistic Byzantine distributed
consensus. Informally speaking, by solving a computationally hard problem one
of the peers is entitled to create the next block, cryptographically linked to the
previous ones. Under the assumption that Byzantine computational power is
suitably limited within the network, the probability that enough work can be
channeled to alter block history decreases with the ageing of the blocks, as much
as new blocks are created [16,11]. Bitcoin reaches finality with an acceptable
probability in about one hour (6 blocks), with limited transactions per second.3
In Proof-Of-Stake (PoS) blockchains peers contribute to the definition of the
next block with a probability proportional to the stake (coins), rather than
computational power, they detain in the system. Safety follows from the honest
2 Monetary and incentive policies, e.g., the economics of tokens, the motivational
reward for peers, and the initial distribution of stake in PoS (see below), may affect
the stability and long-term survival of the blockchain.
3 More technical and comprehensive introductions to blockchains can be found
in [2,32,41].
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peers detaining the majority of stake. Scalability improves in Proof-of-Stake, but
the management of security typically results in being more complex.
The BFT paradigm has also been proposed for blockchain consensus, provid-
ing scalability in transaction per second thanks to low transaction latency and
high throughput. BFT, however, is more constrained in terms of the scalability
in the number of peers [40], since the number and identity of peers needs to be
known and in some cases fixed [5]. This kind of blockchain has been proposed, for
instance, for financial services, where a limited number of known and certified
peers need to exchange fast and numerous transactions. It is worth remarking
that if consensus requires control on peers, a centralised authority might be
required, with implications also on identity, privacy and censorship.
Research question In this paper we focus on BFT blockchains based on quo-
rum systems [39]. In such systems consensus emerges from neighbourhoods of
peers and the properties of such neighborhoods, together with assumptions on
Byzantine failure thresholds, are essential to guarantee the liveness and safety of
the consensus protocol, that is, whether honest peers are able to eventually reach
consensus on a correct next state. At the heart of these protocols is a notion of
trust between peers: nodes select which other nodes to trust, and listen to, in the
network. Interested in understanding how much decentralisation can (or cannot)
be achieved in principle in such systems, we address the following question:
To what extent can consensus be decentralized, when based on trust networks?
We approach the question by using tools from cooperative game theory (specifi-
cally the theory of command games [22,21]) and computational complexity the-
ory. The interface of methods from theoretical economics and computational
complexity have proven extremely prolific in other areas of computer science and
artificial intelligence, such as computational social choice theory [3,20]. Our pa-
per also aims to showcase these methods for general investigations on blockchain
consensus and decentralisation.
We will consider Ripple [6,37] and Stellar [30], two Quorum-based blockchains
attempting to extend the applicability of the BFT paradigm from a permissioned
to a permissionless setting, aiming at improving decentralisation.
Ripple provides frictionless global payments and corporate-oriented efficient
transactions. It currently relies on a list of “authorised” validators4 in charge of
the correctness of transactions. Access is permissioned and each peer will need to
have in their neighbourhood of trust a number of validators from the list. While
the list was originally entirely composed by Ripple validators, today third-party
validators, e.g., private companies and universities, have been included.
Stellar provides payments and asset management to corporate and individ-
uals, and aims to push decentralisation further by offering open membership
and allowing peers to autonomously define their trust networks, i.e., the set of
4 At the time of writing the list consists of about 30 validators, available at
https://xrpcharts.ripple.com
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validators that they trust. However, strong constraints hold on the topology of
such trust networks.
Both Ripple and Stellar have been object of criticism with respect to the level
of decentralisation of their current implementations, and the need for further
research on protocols like Ripple and Stellar is emphasised, for instance, in [4].
Related work Even though Ripple and Stellar are, respectively, the third and
tenth blockchain systems in terms of market capitalization, very little founda-
tional work exists on their protocols. Correctness analyses of Ripple have been
proposed in [6], and of Stellar in [30,42]. A specific study on the issue of de-
centralisation in Stellar has also very recently been presented in [25]. Authors
investigate the current topology of Stellar’s quorum slices by means of an ex-
tended version of PageRank that they introduce to evaluate nodes’ influence.
Findings about the current status show centralisation on two critical validators,
which are controlled by the Stellar Foundation.
Our paper contributes further general results on the level of decentralization
that could reasonably be achieved in consensus based on open quorum systems.
Paper contribution and outline The contributions of this paper are:
– a novel theoretical framework, rooted in economic theory (command games
[22,21], power indices [33,1]), to ascertain the influence that peers can exert
on each other in quorum systems based on trust networks. This contributes
a novel methodology for a much needed quantitative evaluation of decen-
tralisation in blockchain (here in the context of consensus). The proposed
methods are applied to Ripple and Stellar (Theorem 5).
– a general impossibility of decentralisation result for a class of consensus
protocols of the Ripple type (Theorem 1), which are based on trust networks
with a fixed threshold of tolerable Byzantine peers. This results implies that
in Ripple the necessary existence of validators that must be trusted by every
peer in the network, hindering the possibility of full decentralisation.
– an appraisal of computational barriers to decentralization in protocols like
Stellar, based on so-called federated Byzantine agreement systems. Specifi-
cally, we show that constraints that are necessary to guarantee the safety
of the network require peers to be able to solve problems that are compu-
tationally intractable in principle (Theorems 3 and 4). This result imposes
in Stellar limitations to the autonomous construction of trust networks by
peers, limiting also in this case the possibility of full decentralisation.
Trust networks and command games are introduced in Section 2, impossibility
and intractability results are presented in Section 3, and decentralisation mea-
sures in Section 4. Section 5 contains final considerations and future outlooks.
Relevant literature is discussed throughout the paper, proofs appear in the Ap-
pendix.
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2 Preliminaries
In this section we link the open quorum systems underlying Ripple (trust net-
works [19]) and Stellar (federated Byzantine agreement systems, FBAS, [30]) to
structures studied in the economic theory literature, known as command games.
This will then allow us to import concepts and results from the field of command
games to the workings of consensus in Ripple and Stellar.
2.1 Byzantine Trust Networks
A set of peers, hereafter nodes, want to get to an agreement on a binary opinion
x ∈ {0, 1}, e.g., whether a given transaction should belong, or not, to the current
ledger. The set is open, but we consider a snapshot at a given point in time.
Byzantine nodes, differently from honest ones, can hold and reveal multiple,
inconsistent opinions. The goal of consensus is to have all honest nodes eventually
agreeing on the same opinion (no-forking). Crucially, a honest node’s opinion
depends on the opinions revealed by the nodes (honest or byzantine) that it
trusts.
Definition 1. A Byzantine trust network (BTN) is a tuple T = 〈N,H, Ti, Ci〉
where:
– N = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set of nodes.
– H ⊆ N is the set of honest nodes. B = N\H is the set of Byzantine nodes.
– Ti ⊆ N , for each node i ∈ H, is the non-empty set of nodes that i trusts,
i.e., its trust set.5
– Ci ⊂ 2Ti , for each honest node i ∈ H, is the collection of sets of nodes,
among those that i trusts, that can determine i’s opinion. We refer to Ci
as the set of winning coalitions for node i. For ease of presentation we will
sometimes treat C also as a function assigning a set of subsets of N to each
honest node.
We will sometimes assume that, for all i, i ∈ Ti. We will sometimes furthermore
assume that for all i ∈ H, {i} ∈ Ci. In such a case the BTN is said to be vetoed.
Intuitively, a winning coalition C ∈ Ci is a set of nodes such that, if all members
of one of such coalition agree on a value, then that value is also i’s opinion. When
i belongs to Ci, i cannot validate an opinion unless it also holds such opinion
(it holds a veto for its own validation). In the Stellar white paper [30] BTN are
referred to as federated Byzantine agreement systems (FBAS), or as federated
Byzantine quorum systems in [42], and the winning coalitions of a node are
referred to as quorum slices. BTNs are also known structures in the economic
theory literature, where they are referred to as command games [22,21], or as
simple game structures [24].
A natural class of BTNs is obtained by associating a quota, or threshold,
qi ∈ (0.5, 1] to each honest node i:
6
5 Ripple and Stellar refer to trust sets as unique node lists (UNLs).
6 Cf. [17].
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Definition 2. A Quota Byzantine Trust Network (QBTN) is a BTN such that
for all i ∈ H there exists a quota qi ∈ (0.5, 1] such that:
Ci = {C ⊆ Ti | |C| ≥ qi · |Ti|} .
A QBTN is therefore denoted by a tuple T = 〈N,H, Ti, qi〉. A QBTN is said to
be uniform whenever qi = qj for any i, j ∈ H.
Intuitively, QBTNs are BTNs where the winning coalitions of a node are de-
termined by a numerical quota: i’s opinion is determined whenever at least qi
nodes in Ti hold that opinion. Assuming for each Ti a standard failure model
with a fraction of Byzantine node bi ∈ [0, 0.25) (cf. [26]), when qi = 1 − bi it is
guaranteed that i) the quota is met whenever the honest nodes in Ti agree, and
ii) if the quota is met for an opinion x ∈ {0, 1}, then there is at least an honest
majority of nodes with opinion x in the trust set of i. So in this paper we will
assume quota fall in the [0.75, 1] range. A QBTS is said to be uniform whenever
qi = qj for any i, j ∈ H .
The Ripple consensus protocol [6,37] is based on uniform QBTNs with quotas
set to 0.8. The Stellar consensus protocol as described in [30] is not based on
quota but requires the generality of BTNs while assuming them to be vetoed.
Remark 1. In Definition 1 we associate winning coalitions only to honest nodes.
We do this for simplicity but it should be clear that trivial collections of winning
coalitions can be associate also to Byzantine nodes. Since the opinion of a Byzan-
tine node i is not influenced by any other node its trivial collection of winning
coalitions is the set {C ⊆ N | {i} ⊆ C}, that is, the set of all coalitions contain-
ing i. Intuitively, this amounts to stating that i is the only node influencing its
own opinion.
2.2 Opinions and Safety
At any given time, the collection of each node’s opinions defines an opinion profile
that associates a ‘genuine’ opinion from {0, 1} to every honest node (the opinion
that the node reveals to the network). And to each Byzantine node it associates
a function from honest nodes to opinions. This function represents the values
that each Byzantine node would reveal to each honest node in the network that
includes it in its trust set.
Definition 3. An opinion profile o : N → {0, 1}∪{0, 1}H such that o(i) ∈ {0, 1}
if i ∈ H and o(i) ∈ {0, 1}H if i ∈ B.
Intuitively, i’s opinion is settled whenever a winning coalition of trusted nodes
holds that opinion. In a QBTN, i’s opinion (if i is honest) is settled whenever
there are at least qi · |Ti| nodes with a same opinion among the nodes it trusts.
Given an opinion profile o we denote by
T oj (x) = {i ∈ Tj | o(i) = x if i ∈ H, or o(i)(j) = x if i ∈ B} . (1)
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This is the set of nodes (honest or Byzantine), among those that j trusts, holding
opinion x in profile o. We say that i validates x ∈ {0, 1} (in a given o) if
T oi (x) ∈ Ci. We then say that an opinion profile o is forked (or, is a fork) if there
are two honest nodes i, j ∈ H such that i validates x and j validates x in o,
where, given x ∈ {0, 1}, x represents the element of singleton {0, 1} \ {x}.
Let us introduce some auxiliary notions. Let s : N → 2N be a function
picking, for any agent i, one coalition out of Ci.7 Each function s induces an
operator Fs : 2
N → 2N such that Fs(C) =
⋃
i∈C s(i), collecting, for each i in
C, the winning coalition s(i) picked by function s. We further denote by F ks the
k-th iteration of Fs. Since N is finite, for any C ⊆ N there exists k ∈ N such
that F ks (C) = F
k+1
s (C).
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We say that an opinion profile o is strongly forked (or, is a strong fork) if
there are two honest nodes i, j ∈ H and a function s such that all nodes in⋃
1≤m F
m
s ({i}) agree on x and all nodes in
⋃
1≤m F
m
s ({j}) agree on x. Formally:
for all k ∈
⋃
1≤m F
m
s ({i}) o(k) = x, and for all k ∈
⋃
1≤m F
m
s ({j}) o(k) = x.
That is, there is a winning coalition for i agreeing on x and a winning coalition
for j agreeing on x, and all nodes in that winning coalition for i also have a
winning coalition agreeing on x and all nodes in that winning coalition for j
have a winning coalition agreeing on x, and so on.
Definition 4. A BTN is safe if there exists no forked profile for it. It is weakly
safe if there exists no strongly forked profile for it.
Safety rules out the possibility that two honest nodes may settle on different
opinions. Weak safety allows for forks of only a limited kind. It rules out the
possibility that forks are of a ‘deep’ kind involving all winning coalitions upon
which the diverging opinions are rooted. Clearly safety implies weak safety but
not vice versa.
3 (De)centralisation and (In)tractability
This section explores inherent limitations present in the above notion of safety for
BTNs, establishing general limitative results for the class of consensus protocols
based on them, such as Ripple and Stellar. First, it focuses on uniform QBTNs
(Definition 2), as exemplified by the Ripple consensus protocol, showing that
safety drastically limits the freedom of nodes in selecting trustees. Second, it
focuses on safety for general BTNs (Definition 1), as exemplified by the Stellar
consensus protocol, showing that, even though safety in such settings allows for
more freedom on the part of nodes, it does require single nodes to solve decision
problems that are, in principle, computationally intractable.
7 Clearly there are |
∏
i∈H
Wini| such functions.
8 Cf. the Knaster-Tarski theorem [7].
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3.1 Safety Implies Centralization in Uniform QBTNs
We show that for safe consensus to be possible on uniform QBTNs nodes cannot
be fully free to choose their trust set.
The result builds on ideas from [6]. We will use the following auxiliary defi-
nition, also borrowed from [6]:
βij = min {|Ti ∩ Tj |, bi · |Ti|, bj · |Tj|} . (2)
Intuitively, βij denotes the number of Byzantine agents present in the intersec-
tion of the trust sets of i and j. Such a number equals the maximum amount of
Byzantine nodes assumed by the node, either i or j, that tolerates fewer Byzan-
tine nodes. However, such a number cannot obviously exceed the size of the
intersection itself.
Lemma 1 ([6]). Let 〈N,H, Ti, qi〉 be a QBTN. For any profile o and node i ∈ H,
if |T oi (x)| > 0 then for any j ∈ H,
|T oj (x) ∩H | ≥ |Ti ∩ Tj |+ |T
o
i (x)| − |Ti| − βij (3)
|T oj (x)| ≤ |Tj| − |Ti ∩ Tj | − |T
o
i (x)| + |Ti|+ βij (4)
This lemma establishes a lower bound on the number of honest nodes with
opinion x that a honest node j can observe in its trust set, given the number
of nodes (not necessarily honest) that another honest node i observes. It is used
in the proof of Lemma 2. Notice that the upper bound in (4) is not necessarily
strict as illustrated in the following example.
Example 1. Let 〈N,H, Ti, qi〉 be such that: N = {1, . . . , 5}, B = {3} (recall
N = H ∪B), T1 = T2 = {1, 2, 3} and T4 = T5 = {3, 4, 5}, q1 = q2 = q4 = q5 = 1.
Let then o be such that o(1) = o(2) = 1, o(4) = o(5) = 0, finally o(3) be such
that o(3)(1) = o(3)(2) = 1 and o(3)(4) = o(3)(5) = 0. We have that 4 and 5 see
no honest node with opinion 1, and we thus have |T o4 (0)| = |T
o
5 (0)| = 3.
Lemma 2. Let T = 〈N,H, Ti, qi〉 be a safe uniform QBTN. Then for all i, j ∈
H:
|Ti ∩ Tj | >
b
1− b
· (|Ti|+ |Tj |).
It is worth observing that Lemma 2 establishes a conservative lower bound on
the size of the intersection of trust sets required by safety. It is not difficult to
construct uniform QBTNs where the intersection equals 1
2
(|Ti| + |Tj |). This is
the case, for instance, of BTNs where |Ti| = |Tj | for all i, j ∈ H .
Lemma 3. Let 〈N,H, Ti, qi〉 be a uniform BTN. If for all i, j ∈ H,
|Ti ∩ Tj| > 0.25 · (|Ti|+ |Tj|),
then ⋂
i∈H
Ti 6= ∅.
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Theorem 1. In uniform QBTNs with quotas q ∈ [0.75, 0.80], safety implies the
existence of nodes that are trusted by all honest nodes.
Proof. The result follows directly from Lemmas 2 and 3 and the observation
that for q ∈ [0.75, 0.80] we have b
1−b ≥ 0.25. ⊓⊔
If we understand decentralisation as the property of trust networks in which
nodes have full freedom on whom to trust in the network, then the theorem can
be interpreted as a general impossibility result for decentralised consensus based
on QBTNs: if quotas are uniform, and set in a reasonable way in order to cope
with the presence of Byzantine nodes in trust sets, then the existence of nodes
that are trusted by everyone is a necessary condition for the safety of consensus.
Furthermore, beyond limiting the choice of nodes, a (limited) set of such nodes
clearly represents a dominant position and risk factor for the blockchain.
In general, Theorem 1 applies to any consensus protocol based on uniform BTNs.
In particular, it applies to the Ripple consensus protocol, which uses quota (q =
0.8). In a way, Theorem 1 provides an ex-post analytical justification to the
current design of the Ripple trust network where all trust sets are required to
include a same subset of nodes (cf. [6]). Currently Ripple relies on a single UNL
mostly controlled by Ripple, although plans for further decentralisation are under
discussion.9
3.2 Safety and Quorum Intersection in BTNs
In this and the next section we consider the general case of (vetoed) BTNs, to
which Theorem 1 does not apply. This more general setting applies to Stellar as
presented in its white paper [30] where the Stellar consensus protocol does not
presuppose uniformity of quotas. Actually, Stellar aims to offer open membership
and freedom in choosing it’s own trust networks, which, together with BFT good
scalability, would yield a decentralised and efficient blockchain, an interesting
value proposition. In such a setting an intuitive necessary condition for safety is
that trust networks are sufficiently ‘interconnected’, in the following sense.
Let 〈N,H, Ti, Ci〉 be a vetoed BTN. A non-empty set Q ⊆ N is called a
quorum if and only if ∀i ∈ Q, ∃C ∈ Ci s.t. C ⊆ Q. Quora are, intuitively, sets of
nodes that can form an agreement. Such sets need to be in a pairwise non-empty
intersection relation.
Definition 5 (Quorum intersection [30]). A vetoed BTN enjoys quorum
intersection (QI) whenever for any two sets Q1, Q2 ⊆ H, if Q1 and Q2 are
quora, then Q1 ∩Q2 6= ∅.
Example 2. In Figure 1 the quora are
{1, 2, 3} {4, 5, 6} {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}
9 Cf. https://xrpcharts.ripple.com/ .
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5 6
Fig. 1. Example from [30] of a vetoed BTN lacking QI. Arrows denote which nodes
each node trusts (reflexive arrows omitted). C(1) = C(2) = C(3) = {{1, 2, 3}} and
C(4) = C(5) = C(6) = {{4, 5, 6}}.
This command game does not enjoy QI, but both of its disjoint components
(with support {1, 2, 3} and {4, 5, 6}) do. Suppose instead that {1, 2, 3, 5} ∈ C(3),
that is, 3 also ‘looks at’ 5 to determine its own value. Then the system would
satisfy QI with quora:
{4, 5, 6} {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}
Example 3. In a BTN T where ∀i ∈ N , C(i) = {N}, the set N of all nodes is
the unique quorum, and T trivially enjoys quorum intersection.
In fact, there is a close relationship between quorum intersection and the
property of weak safety:
Theorem 2. A vetoed BTN is weakly safe iff any two quora intersect and such
intersection contains at least one honest node.
Clearly, nodes in a BTN cannot know which nodes are Byzantine so their best
effort to guarantee weak safety is to guarantee QI is not violated.10
3.3 The intractability of maintaining quorum intersection
Quorum intersection is in fact assumed by all the existing correctness analyses
of Stellar [30,42]. It is furthermore stressed in [30, p. 9] that: “[. . . ] it is the
responsibility of each node i to ensure Ci [notation adapted] does not violate
quorum intersection.”
The key question, from a safety perspective, becomes therefore whether single
nodes can reasonably be tasked with maintaining QI. Apart from incentive issues,
which have also been flagged [25], we argue that this is a problematic requirement
from a merely computational standpoint. This might not be an issue in the
current, small-scale, Stellar configuration (although an instance of QI failure
has been recently reported [29]), but it is something to be considered in a path
towards full decentralisation with a full-scale number of nodes and validators.
As our analysis below shows, maintaining QI is a computationally intractable
problem.
10 Although a BTN could be complemented by a failure model consisting of a set sets of
possible Byzantine nodes representing the possible failure scenario that nodes should
consider (cf. [42]).
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We present two results. First we show that deciding whether a given BTN
satisfies QI is intractable.11 Second, we show that deciding whether adding a new
trust set with winning coalitions preserves QI on a given BTN—arguably the
decision problem that nodes need to solve when linking to the Stellar network—is
also computationally intractable (again coNP-hard). We argue that these results
point to a possible computational bottleneck for the scalability of the consensus
model of Stellar.
We start by defining the problem consisting of deciding whether QI holds in
a given BTN.
Quorum-Intersection
Input: A BTN T = 〈N, C〉 where the sets C(i) for i ∈ N are listed explicitly.12
Question: Is it the case that for each two quora Q1, Q2, Q1 ∩Q2 6= ∅?
Theorem 3. Quorum-Intersection is coNP-complete.
The intractability result of Theorem 3 says that it may be computationally
hard, in practice, to check QI. Such a result is robust in the sense that the related
problem of checking whether QI holds after the insertion of one new slide by a
node into a system that already satisfies QI, is also coNP-complete. (actually
coNP-hard).
Slice-Addition-Quorum-Intersection
Input: Two BTNs T = 〈N, C〉 and T ′ = 〈N, C′〉, such that T ′ satisfies QI,
and such that T is obtained from T ′ by adding one single slice to C′(i) for
some i ∈ N , where the sets C(i) and C′(i) for all i ∈ N are listed explicitly.
Question: Is it the case that for each two quora Q1, Q2 of T Q1 ∩Q2 6= ∅?
Theorem 4. Slice-Addition-Quorum-Intersection is coNP-complete.
4 Quantifying Influence on Consensus in BTNs
Theorem 1 showed that, in uniform QBTNs, safety implies the existence of nodes
that are trusted by all honest nodes. While this can definitely be interpreted as
a high level of centralisation required by safety, it is worth trying to precisely
quantify the effect that the existence of all-trusted nodes has on consensus. In
PoW and PoS protocols it is straightforward, at least by first approximation, to
understand what the influence of each node is on the consensus process: each
11 An equivalent result has been recently presented in [27]. That paper provides a
proof of NP-completeness (via reduction from the Set Splitting Problem) of the
complementary problem for which we prove coNP-completeness (via reduction from
3SAT).
12 For the purpose of this and the following result we do not need to take into consid-
eration the H and Ti elements of a BTN (Definition 1). We therefore omit them for
conciseness.
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node will be able to determine a fraction of blocks corresponding to the node’s
share of total hashing power (PoW) or of total stakes (PoS). For consensus
based on voting on trust structures, like in Ripple and Stellar, quantifying nodes’
influence in a principled way is not obvious. This section proposes a methodology
for such quantification that leverages the theory of voting games.
4.1 Influence Matrices
Within a BTN, a simple game is associated to each honest node. The Penrose-
Banzhaf index [33,1] of j in the simple game 〈Ti, Ci〉 of node i is
Bi(j) =
1
2n−1
∑
C⊆N\{j}
v(C ∪ {j})− v(C), (5)
which measures the probability that node j ∈ Ti is pivotal in a coalition to
determine i’s opinion, assuming all other agents in Ti have uniformly random
opinions. Indeed v(C) = 1 if C allows a decision to be made, and v(C) = 0
otherwise. Informally speaking, the sum counts all the cases in which j is needed
to enable the decision of i, normalised on the possible 2n−1 coalitions without j.
For any agent j 6∈ Ti we stipulate B(j) = 0, as nodes that i does not trust can-
not influence i’s opinion directly (they are ‘dummy agents’ in the game-theoretic
jargon). Byzantine nodes are assigned degenerate simple games containing a sin-
gleton winning coalition containing themselves (cf. Remark 1 above). Byzantine
agents cannot be influenced: for all i ∈ N\H from the degenerate simple game
associated to i we have Bi(i) = 1, and Bi(j) = 0 for each j 6= i. The normalised
version of the Penrose-Banzhaf index NBi(j) is:
NBi(j) =
Bi(j)∑
k∈N Bi(k)
(6)
Given a BTN, we associate to each honest node i a vector [NBi(1), . . . ,NBi(n)]
of normalized Penrose-Banzhaf indices capturing the influence that each node
has on i. Clearly
∑
j∈N NBi(j) = 1 and NB(j) > 0 only if j ∈ Ti, for any i ∈ N .
Notice that the vector of a Byzantine node i is degenerate: NBi(i) = 1 and
NBi(j) = 0 for each j 6= i.
It follows that each BTN T can be described by a stochastic N ×N matrix
I(T ) =


I11 I12 I13 . . . I1n
I21 I22 I23 . . . I2n
...
...
...
. . .
...
In1 In2 In3 . . . Inn


where Iij denotes the normalized Penrose-Banzhaf index NBi(j) of node j in
the simple game associated to i. We call such matrix I(T ) = [Iij ]i,j∈N the
influence matrix (of T ). We will drop reference to T when not needed. The
matrix encodes the influence that each node has on each other. Matrices of this
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type have a long history in the mathematical modeling of influence in economics
and the social sciences dating back to [14,8], and have recently received renewed
attention [23].13 Similar matrices, but based on the Shapley-Shubik power index
[38] instead of the Penrose-Banzhaf one, have more recently been studied in
[22,21].14
Example 4. Consider the following BTN with no Byzantine nodes and consisting
of 6 agents all having a same set of 5 agents as trust set: N = H = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6},
Ti = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} for all i ∈ N and qi = 0.8 for all i ∈ N . By (5) and (6)
for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} we have Bj(i) =
2
8
and NBj(i) =
1
5
, for each node
j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. The influence matrix describing this BTN consists of 6 identical
row vectors
[
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
0.
]
Consider now a variant of the above BTN where node 5 is Byzantine. The in-
fluence matrix describing this variant consists of 5 identical vectors
[
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
0.
]
for the rows corresponding to nodes 1− 4 and 6, and the degenerate row vector[
0 0 0 0 1 0.
]
for the row of node 5. That is, all the nodes in Ti have the same
influence on honest nodes, but no honest node influences 5.
4.2 Limit Influence
Pushing further the game theoretic framework, by using an influence matrix we
can pinpoint the influence of any node j on determining node i’s opinion:
Iij represents the probability that j can directly sway i to validate a value x.
This is j’s direct influence on i.
I2ij represents the probability that j can sway i’s opinion in two steps, by sway-
ing the opinion of an intermediate node k which in turn sways i’s opinion
directly. This is j’s indirect (2-step) influence on i.
Ikij more generally represents j’s indirect (k-step) influence on i.
So the influence (direct or indirect) of j on i in a BTN is given by the total
probability of all ways in which j can sway i’s opinion. Formally this amounts
to limt→∞(I
t)ij , provided such limit exists. In yet other words, this denotes the
likelihood that j is able to determine the value i validates.
We are then in the position to quantify what the influence is of each node on
every other node by taking the limit of the power of the influence matrix of the
BTN T , that is:
I(T )∞ = lim
t→∞
I(T )t (7)
If the limit matrix in (7) exists, we say that the influence matrix I(T ) is regular.
We say that it is fully regular when its limit matrix exists and it is such that all
rows are identical.15 Intuitively, regularity means that it is possible to precisely
quantify the influence of each node on each other node; full regularity means
that every node has the same influence on every other node.
13 See also [34,35] for an overview of such models.
14 For a comparison between these two power indeces we refer the reader to [12].
15 The ‘regularity’ and ‘full regularity’ terminology are borrowed from [15] and [34].
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Example 5. Consider again the two BTNs introduced in Example 4. In the first
case, where all nodes are honest, all nodes belonging to some trust set have
positive and—given the symmetry built in the example—the same influence:


1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
0
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
0
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
0
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
0
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
0
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
0


=


1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
0
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
0
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
0
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
0
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
0
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
0


2
= lim
t→∞


1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
0
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
0
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
0
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
0
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
0
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
0


t
In the second case, where node 5 is Byzantine, the only node having positive
influence (total influence 1 in this example) is precisely 5:
lim
t→∞


1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
0
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
0
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
0
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
0
0 0 0 0 1 0
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
0


t
=


0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 0


In other words, the only node having influence on which values will be validated
by other nodes, and therefore which values will be agreed upon, is the Byzantine
node.
4.3 Limit Influence in Ripple and Stellar
Theorem 1 established that in uniform QBTN, and therefore Ripple, safety re-
quires centralisation in the sense of requiring a non-empty set of nodes trusted
by all other nodes. While this does not apply in general to Stellar, recent studies
have highlighted that Stellar enjoys a similar level of centralisation.16
Here we put the above methodology at work to study limit influence in cen-
tralised BTNs, that is BTNs where nodes exist that are trusted by all nodes.
We show (Theorem 5) that: the existence of nodes trusted by all nodes makes
it possible to establish limit influence (first claim); this limit influence is such
that every node has the same limit influence on every other node (second claim)
when at most one Byzantine node exists in the BTN; but if only just one all-
trusted node trusts a Byzantine node, no honest node has limit influence on
any other honest node (third claim). That is, in a centralised BTN the power of
determining consensus values is all in the hands of Byzantine nodes.
Theorem 5. Let T be a BTN. If T is such that
⋂
i∈H Ti 6= ∅ then:
16 Data analysis of the current Stellar network has shown [25] that one of the three
Stellar foundations validators is included in all trust sets. If we treat the Stellar
foundation to be operating as one node, Stellar satisfies de facto the same level of
centralisation that we have shown is analytically required for Ripple.
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1) I(T ) is regular;
2) I(T ) is fully regular if in addition T is such that |B| ≤ 1;
3) and, if there exists j ∈
(⋂
i∈H Ti
)
∩ H such that Tj ∩ B 6= ∅ then for all
j, k ∈ H, I(T )∞jk = 0.
Again, it is worth noticing that this is a general protocol-independent result:
it concerns all protocols working on centralized BTNs. In particular, it applies
to the setup of the Ripple trust network under the assumption of safety (by
Theorem 1) and to the current setup of the Stellar trust network.
5 Conclusions
We have presented a framework to quantitatively characterise decentralisation,
a foundational and highly innovative property of blockchain technologies. Al-
though largely discussed, decentralisation is hard to define, as it is a complex
property depending on many aspects of the multidisciplinary and multi-layered
design of blockchains. As a consequence, it is also a property difficult to be
formally defined and quantitatively analysed.
We have addressed decentralisation in the specific context of BFT consensus
based on open quorum systems, showcasing the relevance of tools from economic
theory (command games, power indices) and computational complexity theory.
We argue that the obtained results show this is a promising general approach to
the formal analysis of decentralisation.
We focused on a general class of consensus, linking decentralisation to a pre-
cise measure of the influence of each peer in the network (a theme largely studied
in economics), an analysis of the structural properties of the consensus network,
and the computational complexity of some proposed solutions. The obtained
limiting results on Ripple and Stellar are coherent with the current practice and
the proposals that industry is putting forward to improve decentralisation.
Our results point to several avenues of future research. We are planning to ex-
tend our analysis to other blockchains based on BFT consensus that are currently
being developed, noticeably Cobalt [10] as an evolution of the Ripple/Stellar
tradition. These will offer interesting use cases for benchmarking our approach.
More generally, we also want to explore the applicability of the methodology
beyond the framework of Byzantine Trust Networks, since measures of the rela-
tive influence of peers are of interest for other blockchain frameworks, e.g. PoS.
At the same time, we also intend to build on such measures to address the re-
lationships between influence, decentralisation and, crucially, revenue. Properly
understanding such mechanisms will serve to the long-term goal of designing
more reliable and robust blockchains.
On the application side, the development of a prototype analysis toolkit and
collection of relevant data is also an ongoing activity.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proofs of Section 2
Lemma 1
Proof. (3) Assume |T oi (x)| > 0. Under this assumption j observes at least
|T oi (x)∩ Tj ∩H | nodes with opinion x in Tj. Those are the honest nodes among
the nodes with opinion x that both i and j can observe. So
|T oj (x) ∩H | ≥ |T
o
i (x) ∩ Tj ∩H |.
Now among the nodes in T oi (x)∩ Tj there are at most βij Byzantine nodes that
could reveal the opposite opinion x to j. So,
|T oi (x) ∩ Tj ∩H | ≥ |T
o
i (x) ∩ Tj | − βij .
The claim is finally established by the following series of (in)equalities:
|T oi (x) ∩ Tj ∩H | ≥ |T
o
i (x) ∩ Tj | − βij
≥ |T oi (x)| − |Ti\Tj| − βij
= |T oi (x)| − |Ti|+ |Ti ∩ Tj| − βij
(4) Assume |T oi (x)| > 0. By (3), |T
o
j (x)∩H | = |Ti∩Tj |+ |T
o
i (x)|−|Ti|−βij
whenever only the honest nodes in Tj have opinion x. It follows that
|T oj (x)| ≤ |Tj | − (|Ti ∩ Tj |+ |T
o
i (x)| − |Ti| − βij)
= |Tj | − |Ti ∩ Tj| − |T
o
i (x)|+ |Ti|+ βij .
This completes the proof. ⊓⊔
Lemma 2
Proof. The proof consists of two sub-arguments. First we show that safety
implies that, for all i, j ∈ H :
|Ti ∩ Tj| > b · (|Ti|+ |Tj|) + βij (8)
By safety, if T oi (x) ≥ qi|Ti| with i ∈ H , then for all j ∈ H T
o
j (x) < q|Tj |. Assume
T oi (x) ≥ q|Ti| with i ∈ H . By Lemma 1 and safety we have:
T oj (x) ≤ |Tj | − |Ti ∩ Tj | − q|Ti|+ |Ti|+ βij
< q|Tj |
From |Tj | − |Ti ∩ Tj| − q|Ti|+ |Ti|+ βij < q|Tj | we thus obtain
|Tj| − q|Tj | − q|Ti|+ |Ti|+ βij = b · (|Ti|+ |Tj |) + βij
< |Ti ∩ Tj |
16
as desired.17
Second We show that safety also implies that, for all i, j ∈ H :
b · (|Ti|+ |Tj|) + βij >
b
1− b
(|Ti|+ |Tj|) (9)
We have established that safety implies that for all i, j ∈ H , |Ti ∩ Tj| >
b · (|Ti|+ |Tj|) + βij (8), that is, the size of the intersection of the trust sets of i
and j should be larger than the maximum possible fraction of Byzantine nodes
times the combined size of the trust sets, plus βij . Now recall the definition of
βij (2). By (8) it cannot be the case that βij = |Ti∩Tj |. So βij = b|Tk| where Tk
is the the smallest set between Ti and Tj. Now assume, w.l.o.g. that |Ti| ≥ |Tj |
and so that |Tj | = x · |Ti| with x ∈ (0, 1]. By (8) we have:
|Ti ∩ Tj| > b(|Ti|+ |Tj|) + βij
= b(|Ti|+ x|Ti|) + bx|Ti|
= b|Ti|(1 + 2x)
From this, and the fact that a set is always at least as large as its intersection
with another we obtain a lower bound for x by the following series of inequalities:
x|Ti| ≥ |Ti ∩ Tj|
x|Ti| > b|Ti|(1 + 2x)
x > b(1 + 2x)
x > b+ 2bx
x− 2bx > b
x(1 − 2b) > b
x >
b
1− 2b
By substituting b
1−2b for x in (8) we thus obtain a lower bound for |Ti ∩ Tj | in
b. We then reformulate (8) in terms of the combined size α = |Ti| + |Tj| of the
two trust sets:
|Ti ∩ Tj| > b(|Ti|+ x|Ti|︸ ︷︷ ︸
α
) + bx|Ti|
> b(|Ti|+
b
1− 2b
|Ti|) + b
b
1− 2b
|Ti|
= bα+ b
b
1− 2b
1− 2b
1− b
α as|Ti| = α
1− 2b
1− b
= bα(1 +
b
1− b
)
=
b
1− b
α
17 Cf. [6, Proposition 4].
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So safety implies that the size of the intersection of Ti and Tj must be larger
than the fraction b
1−b of the combined size of the two sets. ⊓⊔
Lemma 3
Proof. The proof is by induction on |H |. Base if |H | = 1 the claim holds
trivially. Step Now assume the claim holds for |H | = m (IH). We prove it holds
for |H | = m + 1. So assume for all i, j ∈ H , |Ti ∩ Tj| > 0.25 · (|Ti| + |Tj |), and
let k be the m + 1th node in H . By IH we know that
⋂
i∈H\{k} Ti 6= ∅. Now
take one of the smallest (w.r.t. size) Hi with i ∈ H\ {k} and call it Hj . There
are two cases. |Hk| ≤ |Hj | . Then |Hj ∩Hk| ≥ 0.5 · |Hk|. Since Hj was smallest
amongst the Hi, it also hols that ∀i ∈ H |Hi ∩ Hk| ≥ 0.5 · |Hk|. From this we
conclude that
⋂
i∈H Ti 6= ∅. |Hk| > |Hj | Then |Hj ∩Hk| ≥ 0.5 · |Hj |. Since Hj
was smallest amongst the Hi, it also hols that ∀i ∈ H |Hi∩Hj | ≥ 0.5 · |Hj|, from
which we also conclude
⋂
i∈H Ti 6= ∅. ⊓⊔
Theorem 2
Proof. Left to right Straightforwardly proven by contraposition. Right to left
Proceed by contraposition and assume there is a profile o, a function s and agents
1 and 2 such that all k ∈ C1 =
⋃
1≤m F
m
s ({1}) agree on x and all k ∈ C2 =⋃
1≤m F
m
s ({2}) agree on x. Observe that C1 and C2 are quora containing (since
the BTN is vetoed) 1 and 2. There are two cases. Either C1 ∩ C2 = ∅, or if
that is not the case then C1 ∩ C2 ⊆ B as only Byzantine nodes can reveal
different opinions to different nodes. Hence C1 and C2 are either disjoint or their
intersection contains only Byzantine nodes. ⊓⊔
Theorem 3
Proof. To see that the problem is contained in coNP, we describe a nondeter-
ministic polynomial-time algorithm to decide whether C does not have the quo-
rum intersection property. The algorithm guesses two disjoint sets Q1, Q2 ⊆ N .
Then, for each u ∈ [2] and for each i ∈ Qu, the algorithm checks if there is
some C ∈ C(i) such that C ⊆ Qu. That is, the algorithm verifies that Q1 and Q2
are quora (which is the case if and only if all checks succeed). Clearly, all checks
can be performed in polynomial time. Thus, deciding whether C has the quorum
intersection property is in coNP.
To show coNP-hardness, we reduce from the coNP-complete propositional
unsatisfiability problem (UNSAT). Let ϕ be a propositional formula containing
the propositional variables x1, . . . , xn. Without loss of generality, we may assume
that ϕ is in 3CNF, i.e., that ϕ = c1 ∧ · · · ∧ cm and that for each j ∈ [m], cj =
(Tj,1 ∨ Tj,2 ∨ Tj,3), where Tj,1, Tj,2, Tj,3 are literals. We construct a command
game C = 〈N, C〉 that has the quorum intersection property if and only if ϕ is
unsatisfiable.
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We let:
N = {z0, z1} ∪ {cj | j ∈ [m]} ∪ {yi, pi, ni | i ∈ [n]}.
That is, we have nodes z0, z1, a node cj for each clause of ϕ, and nodes yi, pi, ni
for each variable occurring in ϕ.
We define the sets of winning coalitions of the nodes in N as follows:
C(z0) = {{z0, y1, . . . , yn}};
C(z1) = {{z1, c1, . . . , cm}};
C(yi) = {{yi, pi}, {yi, ni}} foreach i ∈ [n];
C(cj) = {{cj, σ(Tj,1)}, {cj, σ(Tj,2)}, {cj, σ(Tj,3)}} foreach j ∈ [m];
C(pi) = {{pi, z0}, {pi, z1}} foreach i ∈ [n]; and
C(ni) = {{ni, z0}, {ni, z1}} foreach i ∈ [n];
where for each positive literal xi, we let σ(xi) = pi; and for each negative lit-
eral ¬xi, we let σ(¬xi) = ni.
We argue that C = 〈N, C〉 has the quorum intersection property if and only
if ϕ is unsatisfiable. We show the equivalent statement that C = 〈N, C〉 does not
have the quorum intersection property if and only if ϕ is satisfiable.
(⇒) Suppose that there exist Q1, Q2 ∈ Q
C such that Q1 ∩ Q2 = ∅. We may
assume without loss of generality that Q1 and Q2 are core quora. We know that
neither Q1 nor Q2 can contain both z0 and z1, because each quorum of C must
contain either z0 or z1 (by the specific construction of C). Thus, we may assume
that z0 ∈ Q2 and z1 ∈ Q1.
Then also {y1, . . . , yn} ⊆ Q2. Moreover, for each i ∈ [n], we know that then
either pi ∈ Q2 or ni ∈ Q2 (and not both). We also know that {c1, . . . , cm} ⊆
Q1. Now define the truth assignment α : {x1, . . . , xn} → {0, 1} as follows. For
each i ∈ [n], we let α(xi) = 1 if ni ∈ Q2 and we let α(xi) = 0 if pi ∈ Q2.
We show that α satisfies ϕ. Take an arbitrary clause cj of ϕ. Due to the con-
struction of C(cj), we know thatQ1 contains (at least) one of σ(Tj,1), σ(Tj,2), σ(Tj,3).
Take some u ∈ [3] such that σ(Tj,u) ∈ Q1. We show that α satisfies Tj,u. To
derive a contradiction, suppose the contrary, i.e., that α does not satisfy Tj,u.
Then σ(Tj,u) ∈ Q2 (by the construction of α), and thus Q1 ∩ Q2 6= ∅, which
contradicts our initial assumption that Q1 ∩ Q2 = ∅. Thus, we can conclude
that α satisfies Tj,u. This concludes our proof that ϕ is satisfiable.
(⇐) Conversely, suppose that ϕ is satisfiable, i.e., that there is some truth
assignment α : {x1, . . . , xn} → {0, 1} that satisfies all clauses of ϕ. For each
clause cj , define ρ(cj) to be some literal Tj,u in cj that is satisfied by α. Moreover,
for each i ∈ [n], let µ(xi) = ni if α(xi) = 1 and µ(xi) = pi if α(xi) = 0. Consider
the following two sets Q1, Q2 ⊆ N :
Q1 = {z1, c1, . . . , cm} ∪ {σ(ρ(cj)) | j ∈ [m]}; and
Q2 = {z0, y1, . . . , yn} ∪ {µ(xi) | i ∈ [n]};
It is straightforward to verify that Q1 and Q2 are both quora, i.e., that Q1, Q2 ∈
QC. Moreover, since it holds that Q1 ∩Q2 = ∅, we know that C does not satisfy
the quorum intersection property. ⊓⊔
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Theorem 4
Proof (sketch). Membership in coNP follows directly from Proposition 3. We
show coNP-hardness by modifying the reduction given in the proof of Propo-
sition 3. We describe a reduction from UNSAT. Let ϕ be a propositional for-
mula containing the propositional variables x1, . . . , xn. Without loss of gener-
ality, we may assume that ϕ is in 3CNF. Moreover, without loss of generality,
we may assume that ϕ[x1 7→ 1] is unsatisfiable. We construct the command
game C = 〈N, C〉 as in the proof of Proposition 3. Moreover, we transform C
into C′ by removing the slice {y1, n1} from C(y1). By a similar argument as the
one used in the proof of Proposition 3, we know that the command game C′
satisfies the quorum intersection property, because ϕ[x1 7→ 1] is unsatisfiable.
Moreover, C satisfies the quorum intersection property if and only if ϕ is unsat-
isfiable. ⊓⊔
A.2 Proofs of Section 4
Theorem 5
Proof. We first need to introduce some auxiliary notation. Given an influence ma-
trix I, G(I) = 〈N,E〉 denotes the (directed) graph of I, where E = {ij | Iji > 0}.
Intuitively ji ∈ E whenever j influences i (i.e., has a positive Banzhaf-Penrose in-
dex in i’s simple game). By assumption there exist nodes that influence all other
honest nodes (themselves included). Let nowE(
⋂
i∈H Ti) =
{
i ∈ N | ∃j ∈
⋂
i∈H Ti, ij ∈ E
}
,
that is, the set of nodes that influence some node that influences all honest nodes.
We distinguish three cases.
|B| = 0 So there are no Byzantine nodes in T , and N = H = E(
⋂
i∈H Ti) It
follows that G(I(T )) is strongly connected (there exists a path from every node
to every node) and aperiodic (there are no two cycles in the graph which are
divided by an integer larger than 1). Trivially, it is also closed (there exists no
node outsie G(I(T )) that influences nodes in G(I(T ))). The full regularity of I
then follows from known results on influence matrices (cf. [34, Lemma 11]): if
G(I) contains only one strongly connected component and is aperiodic, then I
is fully regular.
|B| = 1 and E(
⋂
i∈H Ti) ∩B 6= ∅ So there exists exactly one Byzantine node
in N , which furthermore belongs to E(
⋂
i∈H Ti) (that is, it influences at least
one honest node influencing in turn all honest nodes). Call i such Byzantine
agent. Recall that, by construction, ii ∈ E. So the subgraph consisting of i and
the self-loop ii is the only closed, aperiodic, strongly connected component of
G(I(T )). Full regularity therefore follows by know results as in the previous case.
|B| ≥ 1 or E(
⋂
i∈H Ti) ∩B = ∅ So there exist several Byzantine nodes in N
or there are Byzantine nodes which do not influence nodes in
⋂
i∈H Ti. Both such
cases determine the existence, by arguments analogous to those provided for the
previous two cases, of several closed, aperiodic strongly connected components in
G(I(T )). The regularity of I then follows again from known results on influence
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matrices (cf. [34, Theorem 12], [23, Theorem 8.1]: if all closed strongly connected
components of G(I) are aperiodic, then I is regular.
In all three cases I is regular, proving claim 1). In the first two cases (|B| ≤
1) I is furthermore fully regular, establishing claim 2). Finally, to prove claim
3) we reason as follows. If there exists a honest agent in
⋂
i∈H Ti trusting a
Byzantine agent, then the only closed strongly connected components of G(I)
are the Byzantine nodes. In the limit, such nodes will therefore be the only ones
having positive influence. ⊓⊔
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